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Has Trump Reshuffled the Cards for Europe? 
Sven Biscop  
“I think NATO may be obsolete”. When 
Donald Trump, the next President of the 
United States, spoke these words during 
the campaign, he most likely had only a 
vague idea of how he would act upon 
them. But one thing is certain: if he made 
the statement, it is because he knew it to 
be a vote-winner. And win he did. Has his 
election reshuffled the cards for European 
diplomacy and defence? 
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unjustified. Take the US out of NATO, and 
the collective defence guarantee (Article 5) 
looks a lot less credible – if at all. That is why 
the doubt that Trump‟s statements about 
NATO have induced is so dangerous. Not that 
Russia is gearing up to invade the Baltic states 
– that would still force all Allies, including the 
US, to unambiguously and immediately declare 
their military support. Putin is smarter than 
that. He has an interest in exploiting the 
vacuum that Trump‟s ambiguity has created, 
under cover of which he can pursue more 
assertive policies in the countries wedged in 
between the EU/NATO and Russia.  
 
DEFENCE  
If Europeans want their defence to be less 
dependent on the vagaries of US domestic 
politics, they need to acquire the means to 
achieve strategic autonomy: the ability to 
undertake not all, but certain military tasks 
alone. The EU Global Strategy (EUGS), 
presented to the European Council last June, 
puts forward exactly this objective. The way to 
reach it is not necessarily for Europe as a 
whole to spend a lot more on defence but, 
first, to ensure that every EU and NATO 
member pays its due – the EU average of 
1.5% of GDP spent on defence is a real and 
realistic target.  
 
Second, making full use of EU institutions and 
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The fact that Trump has won, means that his 
view is more than just a marginal opinion. 
Support for European security is much less 
automatic than it once was, and the view that 
Americans are doing too much and Europeans 
too little is widespread. It‟s an opinion 
underpinned by academic argument. In his 
2014 book Restraint – A New Foundation for 
US Grand Strategy, MIT professor Barry 
Posen proposed to greatly reduce American 
involvement in order to force its European 
and Asian allies to stand on their own feet, up 
to the point of Germany and Japan acquiring 
nuclear weapons. In his view, NATO ought to 
be replaced with a more limited arrangement 
between the US and the EU, which should 
organize for its own defence. 
 
The Alliance will not be dissolved as quickly as 
all that. But the criticism of Europe is far from 
unjustified. Take the US out of NATO, and 
the collective defence guarantee (Article 
5) looks a lot less credible – if at all. 
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incentives, Europeans must make the leap 
from defence cooperation to defence 
integration. Instead of just making their forces 
interoperable with each other, they should do 
defence planning as if they had a single force, 
to which each contributes national combat 
units, anchored in multinational corps 
structures with multinational command, 
logistics, maintenance, and training. The 
corollary is that all European states who join in 
such a scheme (hopefully at least a dozen or 
so) should then also do away with all 
structures and units that are, in effect, useless 
– and therefore do not deserve to be called 
capabilities at all– and there are many. This 
would free up budgetary space to invest in the 
strategic enablers which until now the US has 
to provide for nearly every European 
operation.  
 
All of this would allow Europeans to do two 
things: to convince the US to maintain NATO 
by stepping up their own contribution to 
collective defence, and to project power in 
their own broad neighbourhood (under the 
EU or the NATO flag), where the Obama 
administration already made it clear the US will 
no longer always come and solve Europe‟s 
security problems. The more Europeans can 
take care of their own problems, the less risk 
in that same neighbourhood of American 
adventurism, the consequences of which, as 
we know since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
can reverberate for decades. While Trump has 
condemned America‟s wars in the Middle 
East, he also seems to be yearning for a 
dramatic decisive strike against IS. And one 
can easily imagine him lashing out when an 
incident would provoke him to act like he 
thinks a strong commander-in-chief should 
act. He certainly has announced his wish to 
increase the US defence budget. 
 
DIPLOMACY  
The preferred solution to security challenges in 
Europe‟s neighbourhood remains of course a 
 diplomatic one. Europe, through the EU, is 
good at diplomacy. Witness the Iran nuclear 
deal, which would not have happened if the 
EU had not kept negotiations going during all 
those years when the US thought they could 
afford not to talk with Tehran. Witness also 
the Minsk agreement between Ukraine and 
Russia, brokered by Angela Merkel and 
François Hollande and backed up by EU 
sanctions and NATO deterrence.  
 
Will President Trump withdraw US support in 
both these instances?  
 
If Trump seeks to unravel the agreement with 
Iran, which may be a tempting symbolic act, it 
is highly unlikely that the EU will follow suit. 
Not only are European companies, which had 
been chafing at the bit, just re-entering the 
Iranian market. The normalization of relations 
with Iran also is the absolute precondition for 
any attempt to create a dialogue between Iran 
and Saudi Arabia, in order to end their proxy 
war in Syria (and Yemen) and create a stable 
regional order in the Gulf. As much is said in 
the EUGS – but so far the EU plays a 
conspicuously small part in Middle East and 
Gulf diplomacy, even though the spill-over 
effects of continuing war hit it much more 
than the US.  
 
A huge additional European diplomatic effort 
is therefore necessary. It was anyway, 
regardless of the outcome of the US elections, 
but even more so now, including to prevent 
the potential negative fall-out of a prospective 
deal between Trump and Putin.  
 
The Obama administration was of course also 
trying to reach a deal, at least on Syria – that is 
why Foreign Ministers John Kerry and Sergei 
Lavrov met so many times. Had Hillary 
Clinton won, any deal on Syria would still be 
one that keeps Assad in place – Russia‟s 
military intervention made that inevitable 
months ago. Which is why Russia too now has 
an interest in ending the war: it has achieved its 
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war aim, which amounts to the preservation of 
the influence that it already had, and it cannot 
achieve more, as Assad cannot be defeated but 
also cannot win. Trump should not fall for the 
temptation therefore of paying too high a 
price: a Syrian deal at the cost of selling out in 
eastern Europe would not be the early 
demonstration of leadership that he 
undoubtedly seeks.  
 
For sure, the Crimea will not revert to Ukraine. 
That has been tacitly recognized by everybody, 
as has the fact that EU or NATO membership 
for Ukraine is not on offer. Trump may well 
choose to render this explicit, which from the 
EU point of view might perhaps be acceptable 
as long as the core of the Minsk agreement is 
upheld: Moscow must restore the control of 
Ukraine‟s eastern borders to Kiev and end the 
flow of support to the separatist rebels. 
Europe‟s aim is not to entice its eastern 
neighbours into a close partnership, but to 
uphold their sovereignty to choose for 
themselves whom they want to be enticed by. 
And to support them if that does turn out to 
be the EU, as is the case for Ukraine.  
 
“Success” in Syria and the satisfaction of being 
openly recognized as a great leader by 
someone who also imagines himself as such 
may entice Putin to conclude a deal with 
Trump. But it is as likely that the two prima 
donnas will clash. Putin may well continue to 
see more advantages in maintaining a “frozen 
conflict” in eastern Ukraine, giving him a stick 
to beat Kiev and its allies whenever he feels 
like it or his domestic popularity demands it. 
Doubts about Trump‟s commitment to NATO 
may likely increase Putin‟s greed instead of his 
will to compromise. And it is difficult to see 
how he can accept a deal on Syria that does 
not include his ally Iran. Trump will have to 
choose therefore between distancing himself 
from NATO and a deal with Putin, and 
between no deal with Iran or a deal on Syria. 
Nobody knows what his preference might be. 
 
TRADE  
As if all of this did not create enough of a 
headache for Europe, there is also the fear of 
the consequences of Trump‟s views on trade 
for security in Asia. If Trump effectively 
undoes the free trade agreement with 
America‟s Pacific partners (TPP) while 
simultaneously scaling up protectionist 
measures against China, he will create an 
economic and political vacuum and a China 
that is even more eager to fill it. More countries 
that traditionally keep a middle position 
between the US and China might then go the 
way of the Philippines, which has moved a lot 
closer to Beijing, while those who rely on a US 
security guarantee, like Japan, may start 
considering other options.  
 
The EU however has just stated, in the EUGS, 
that it will accelerate free trade negotiations 
with its Asian partners. Those FTAs will then 
suddenly acquire a lot more political and 
security importance than probably the EU had 
imagined. The EU can and will of course not 
replace the US as the external security 
guarantor. But it can play a significant role in 
maintaining some political margin of 
manoeuvre for Asian countries wary of China‟s 
dominant position. There is a growing 
awareness in Brussels that the EU must 
become a political and a security actor, as well 
as an economic player in Asia. For that 
aspiration to become reality however, 
European diplomacy here too will have to 
become a lot more purposeful and united. Just 
this year, a divided EU managed only “to 
acknowledge” the verdict in the arbitration 
procedure between the Philippines and China 
on the South China Sea, in spite of its self-
professed image as the champion of 
international law and multilateral institutions. 
Europe‟s Asian partners were decidedly 
underwhelmed by this lukewarm statement on 
the security issue in Asia today.  
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CONCLUSION 
The election of Donald Trump has reshuffled 
the cards for Europe. Whether activist or 
isolationist, his policies will affect European 
interests – and probably not for the better, 
judging by his pronouncements so far. Does it 
necessarily mean that the cards are stacked 
against Europe? No, but the EU definitely has 
to up its game and show a lot more resolution 
and unity.  
 
The prospect of Brexit has of course just 
rendered that even more difficult than it 
already was. European leaders have to realise 
that they cannot afford to let Brexit distract 
them from the huge foreign policy challenges 
facing them. Clearly, even if and when the UK 
effectively leaves the EU, the remaining 27 will 
have a great interest in continuing to involve it  
 
 
 
in foreign policy-making. The UK however will 
have to accept that if it wants a “special 
relationship” with the EU in foreign and 
security policy, as its foreign policy 
establishment has begun to frame it, it will 
have to ask for it, and put an offer on the table. 
One cannot slam the door and expect to be 
asked to return. Or do British leaders really 
think the special relationship with a US led by 
Trump will suffice to defend British interests?  
 
Europe: up your game, or rien ne va plus.  
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operations, which when taken together easily 
add up to the Headline Goal and more. 
Furthermore, even a quick look at all ongoing 
operations in which forces from EU Member 
States are engaged and at the theatres in which 
the need for additional deployments is very 
likely, immediately reveals that the equivalent 
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